Abstract. Preposed negation yes/no (yn)-questions like
Introduction
This paper is concerned with two generalizations involving negation in yes/no (yn-)questions. The firs generalization reflect an interpretational difference correlated with preposed and non-preposed negation. Preposed negation in yn-questions necessarily contributes the implicature that the speaker believed or at least expected that the positive answer is correct, as in (1) (Ladd, 1981 , Han, 1998 , Büring and Gunlogson, 2000 . 1 Non-preposed negation, instead, does not necessarily give rise to this implicature (Han, 1999) : (2) can be a way of seeking information on whether John is a teetotaler.
(1) Doesn't John drink?
Positive epistemic implicature: The speaker believes or at least expects that John drinks.
(2) Does John not drink? No epistemic implicature necessary.
The contrast can be seen if we take a neutral, epistemically unbiased context like (3) and utter the two questions. (3S) can be understood in this context as an epistemically unbiased question, whereas (3S') necessarily conveys an epistemic bias of the speaker. 2 The resulting generalization is stated in (4).
(3) Scenario: The speaker is organizing a party and she is in charge of supplying all the non-alcoholic beverages for teetotalers. The speaker is going through a list of people that are invited. She has no previous belief or expectation about their drinking habits.
A: Jane and Mary do not drink.
S: OK. What about John? Does he not drink (either)?
S': # OK. What about John? Doesn't he drink (either)?
(4) GENERALIZATION 1: Yn-questions with preposed negation necessarily carry the epistemic implicature that the speaker believed or expected that the positive answer is true. Yn-questions with non-preposed negation do not necessarily carry this epistemic implicature.
The second generalization states an intuitive ambiguity within preposed negation yn-questions. According to Ladd (1981) (see also Ladusaw (1980) ), a yn-question with preposed negation Aux+n't Ô? like (5) is ambiguous between two readings: it can be understood as a question about Ô or as a question about Ô. This is suggested by the fact that we can add to (5) an item requiring a positive clause (too or a Positive Polarity Item) or an item requiring a negative clause (either or a Negative Polarity Item), as illustrated in (6) and in (7). We will call positive items like too, some and already PIs for short, and negative items like either, NPI any and yet NIs.
(5) Isn't Jane coming? (6) A: Ok, now that Stephan has come, we are all here. Let's go! S: Isn't Jane coming too? (7) Scenario: Pat and Jane are two phonologists who are supposed to be speaking in our workshop on optimality and acquisition.
A: Pat is not coming. So we don't have any phonologists in the program.
S: Isn't Jane coming either?
(9) ASSUMPTION: Negation preposing in yn-questions necessarily contributes an epistemic operator VERUM. i'. Yn-questions with VERUM result in partitions where the degree of certainty about a proposition is at issue. They are elicited when the speaker had a previous belief about that proposition but -given some counterevidence implied by the addressee or given the speaker's own doubts-the speaker wants to check the certainty of her original belief. Yn-questions without VERUM result in simple partitions with the equivalence classes Ô and Ô. They are elicited when the speaker had no previous significan belief about Ô or Ô.
ii'. Ladd's intuitive ambiguity is a genuine scopal ambiguity between negation and the VERUM operator. In PI-questions, with the Ô-question reading, negation scopes over VERUM. In NI-questions, with the Ô-question reading, VERUM scopes over negation.
iii'. The LFs for the PI-question and the NI-question interact with the general semantics and pragmatics of yn-questions to derive the positive content Ô of the epistemic implicature. In the NI-question, the speaker asks the addressee for conclusive evidence for Ô; hence, Ô is the addressee's proposition and Ô is the speaker's original belief. In the PI-question, the speaker asks the addressee for any possible (weak or strong) doubts about Ô; hence, the speaker's original belief is Ô and the addressee's proposition (if any) is Ô.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the characterization of the empirical data, adding more examples to support and refin Generalizations 1 an 2 and showing why these generalizations are puzzling. Section 3 addresses question (i). It is shown how the presence of the operator VERUM in yn-questions in general -often contributed by really or by stress on the polarity-triggers the existence of an epistemic implicature. Section 4 answers question (ii). Here, VERUM is used to characterize formally Ladd's intuitive ambiguity. Section 5, which tackles question (iii), derives the right polarity pattern for the epistemic implicatures. Section 6 concludes.
Characterization of the data

CHARACTERIZATION OF THE DATA FOR GENERALIZATION 1
Questions with non-preposed negation can be as epistemically unbiased as regular positive yn-questions. Take examples (10) and (11), which present epistemically unbiased scenarios. In (10), the unbiased speaker asks the positive question Is Jane coming? simply because she is interested in Jane's coming after Pat's coming has been asserted. In a parallel way, in (11), the speaker S asks an unbiased negative question simply because she is interested in Jane not coming, after Pat's not coming has been asserted. In the same unbiased scenario of (11), the question with preposed negation (11S') is odd. That is, (11S') necessarily conveys an epistemic bias, rendering the question unsuitable for this unbiased context.
(10) Scenario: S likes Jane and simply wants to fin out whether she is coming.
A: Pat is coming. S: What about Jane? Is she coming?
(11) Scenario: S hates both Pat and Jane. The prospect of an excursion without them pleases S. S does not have any previous belief about whether either of them is coming or not.
A: Pat is not coming. S: Great! Is Jane not coming (either)? That would be the best!!! S': # Great! Isn't Jane coming (either)? That would be the best!!!
The same point is made by the pair (12)- (13):
(12) Scenario: S interviews a literary critic A on TV about the Spanish writer Rosa Montero (born in 1951).
S: Tell us more about Rosa Montero's early literary activities. For example, did she write poetry in the 70s?
(13) Scenario: S interviews A on TV about Rosa Montero.
A: Mrs. Rosa Montero's writing career is closely related to the political episodes that Spain has lived through since 1936. There were times when she simultaneously worked on prose and poetry, but there were other times full of journalistic prose and completely devoid of poetry. S: Please tell us more about those poetic gaps, and about what exactly caused them. For example, did she not write poetry in the 70s? And, if she didn't, why not? S': # Didn't she write (some/any) poetry in the 70s? And, if she didn't, why not?
Hence, questions with non-preposed negation can be as unbiased as their positive counterparts, but questions with preposed negation are necessarily biased and are thus unsuitable in unbiased scenarios.
This interpretive asymmetry between preposed and non-preposed negation is not an accident of English, but is found in a number of languages. 3 Note that the generation of a positive implicature does not correlate with a specifi position of negation, but with relative positions of negation: i.e., non-preposed vs. preposed position. In English and Bulgarian, preposed negation is in C ¼ . But it has been convincingly argued that, in Spanish and Modern Greek, negation preposed along with the verb is not in C ¼ in sentences with Verb-Subject-Object order (Suñer, 1994, Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou, 1998 Similarly, Korean has two (main) types of negation in yn-questions: negation following tense, as in (18a), and negation preceding tense (with the subtypes short negation and long negation in (18b-c)). The former type necessarily gives rise to an epistemic bias, and the latter type does not necessarily raise this bias. Given the head-finalnes of Korean, we can think of the negation following tense as preposed negation and the one preceding tense as nonpreposed negation. The contrast in all the examples above further illustrates Generalization 1: preposed negation yn-questions necessarily carry a positive epistemic implicature, whereas non-preposed yn-questions do not necessarily do so. Given the standard assumptions about questions and negation, Generalization 1 is puzzling for two reasons. First, it is surprising that a yn-question with negation -in any position whatsoever-could force an epistemic implicature at all. = "that Jane is coming", "that Jane is not coming"
If we add the standard denotation of negation (21) and we compute it under the É-morpheme, no epistemic implicature arises (no matter whether negation was preposed or not in the surface syntax), as shown in (22). And needless to say, questions cannot be negated, hence the possibility of adding 
= "that Jane is not coming", "that Jane is coming" Second, it is surprising that the surface position of negation can contribute any interpretive difference at all, e.g. in the pair Is Jane not coming / Isn't Jane coming?. Leaving aside the É-morpheme, which has widest scope, the only operator here is negation. Hence, a higher or lower position of negation 5 The lexical entry for the É-morpheme in (19) yields exactly the same denotation for positive and negative yn-questions. An alternative entry is given in (i) (see von Stechow (1981:184, fn.14)). Combining this new É with negation, still no epistemic implicature arises.
(ii) a. Is Jane coming?
b. É Jane is coming ´Û¼µ = Õ Õ Û come´ Ûµ = "that Jane is coming" (iii) a. Is Jane not coming? / Isn't Jane coming?
b. É Jane is not coming ´Û¼µ = Õ Õ Û come´ Ûµ = "that Jane is not coming" cannot be correlated with any scopal difference that has interpretive effects. One could argue that preposed negation in yn-questions is sentential negation and that non-preposed negation is constituent negation, negating the event contributed by the Verb Phrase (VP). But, in (23), the negation is not just negating the VP event; it is more like sentential negation negating the entire modal proposition. Still, (23) does not give rise to a necessary epistemic implicature, in contrast with its preposed negation version in (24):
(23) Does John not have to go to the meeting? ( ¾)
No epistemic implicature necessarily.
(24) Doesn't John have to go to the meeting? ( ¾)
Epistemic implicature: The speaker had the previous belief that John has to go to the meeting.
To sum up, preposed negation in yn-questions necessarily carries an epistemic implicature whereas non-preposed negation does not. If we assume that preposed negation only contributes the standard denotation in (21), it is surprising that such an epistemic effect arises, and that the effect depends on the position of negation. 6 6 The epistemic contrast between preposed and non-preposed negation characterized in this section is different from the contextual evidence bias pointed out in Büring and Gunlogson (2000) . Their idea is that contextual evidence for Ô may prompt the speaker to ask the ynquestion Ô? rather than Ô? (or a similar alternative), as in (i):
(i) Scenario: Addressee enters Speaker's windowless computer room wearing a dripping wet raincoat.
S: What's the weather like out there? Is it raining?
S': # What's the weather like out there? Is it sunny?
Note that, though the question in (iS) is prompted by some indicative contextual evidence, it still lacks the strength of the epistemic implicature that we are interested in: Is it raining? in (iS) does not have the strong epistemic bias that Isn't it raining? has. Our epistemic implicature also differs from Büring and Gunlogson's (2000) contextual evidence in the polarity pattern:
whereas the positive epistemic implicature Ô is linked to the negative question Isn't it raining?, contextual evidence for Ô prompts the positive question Is it raining?. Finally, contextual evidence seems to be a valid reason to ask a yn-question in a particular way, but it is not the only one. Relevance of Ô but not of Ô as a suggested answer to a wh-question, interest in the topic Ô rather than Ô, etc., are also sufficien reasons to prompt the speaker to ask the question Ô? rather than Ô? even when no epistemic bias towards Ô exists (see Bolinger (1978) and the related discussion in section 5.1). In contrast, preposed negation yn-questions necessarily convey a previous epistemic bias.
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE DATA FOR GENERALIZATION 2
Recall Ladd's intuitive Ô/ Ô ambiguity in yn-questions with preposed negation. We saw that the PI-question in (6) has a Ô-reading (it double-checks whether it also holds of Jane that she is coming) and the NI-question in (7) has a Ô-reading (it double-checks whether it also holds of Jane that she is not coming). In fact, the Ô-and Ô-readings correspond to PI-and NIquestions unambiguously. The PI-question cannot have a Ô-reading in (25): Another difference between PI-and NI-questions surfaces in suggestion contexts without contradiction. Take a context where the speaker believes Ô or Ô and where no contradiction between her belief and the addressee arises. If Ô is relevant as a suggestion or explanation related to the topic of the conversation, the corresponding PI-question is elicited. But if Ô is relevant to the conversation instead, the NI-question cannot be used to suggest Ô.
Observe the contrast between (27) and (28). In (27), A needs a reviewer that has already reviewed for the journal and S uses the PI-question to suggest Ô (="that Frege has already reviewed for us"). In (28), A needs a new reviewer that has not reviewed for the journal yet, but the plain NI-question (28S) cannot be used to suggest Ô (="that Frege has not reviewed for us yet"). We need a second negative element to achieve the right meaning, as in (28S').
(27) Dialog between two editors of a journal in 1900:
A: I'd like to send this paper out to a senior reviewer, but I'd prefer somebody who has experience with our regulations.
S: Hasn't Frege already reviewed for us? He'd be a good one.
(28) Dialog between two editors of a journal in 1900:
A: I'd like to send this paper out to a senior reviewer, but I'd prefer somebody new. S: # Hasn't Frege reviewed for us yet? He'd be a good one. S': Hasn't Frege not reviewed for us yet? He'd be a good one.
The contrast between (29) and (30) illustrates the same point. In (29), the addressee A is looking for a reason why Montero's name sounds familiar. The proposition "that Montero wrote poetry in the 70s", if true, may provide a reason. The PI-question (29S) can be used to suggest that proposition as a possible explanation. In contrast, the addressee in (30) is looking for a reason why Montero is not cited in a given anthology. To suggest the proposition "that Montero did not write any poetry in the 70s", the simple NI-question (30S) cannot be used, but a second negative element is needed, as in (30S'):
(29) A: I gave your sister a book by Rosa Montero.
S: That name sounds familiar. Didn't she write some poetry in the 70s?
(30) A: A student asked me why Rosa Montero wasn't cited in this article, but I didn't know why. S: # Didn't she write any poetry in the 70s? The author of the article seems to quote only poets that influence him in his youth, in the 70s. S': Didn't she not write any poetry in the 70s? The author of the article seems to quote only poets that influence him in his youth, in the 70s.
That is, in suggestion contexts without contradiction, the speaker can use the PI-question to suggest Ô as a potential explanation or answer to an (implicit) wh-question, but she may not use the NI-question to suggest Ô. 7
These observations are summarized in the revised Generalization 2 below:
7 Observe the difference in acceptability of the NI-question in the contexts (i) and (ii).
In (i), we see, as before, that the NI-question cannot be used to suggest Ô (= "that there is a Chinese restaurant near here"). In (ii), however, the NI-question is felicitous and seems to be used to suggest Ô. But note that, in the latter case, it is crucial that the addressee has already given some answer to the implicit question "Where can we eat tonight?". Since the addressee mentions other restaurant options and does not mention Chinese, the speaker may infer that the addressee believes that Chinese restaurants are out of the question (as a sort of scalar implicature). That contradicts the speaker's original belief Ô (="that there is a Chinese restaurant near here"). This means that examples like (ii) actually involve a tacit contradiction between the speaker's belief and the implicature arising from the addressee's utterance. Pure suggestion contexts do not allow NI-questions. Generalization 2 is surprising for several reasons. First, it is puzzling that PIs are allowed in preposed negation yn-questions at all, since they are not allowed in the corresponding negative declarative versions (Ladusaw, 1980 , Progovac, 1994 . This is shown in (32). Unless we understand the examples in (32a-b) as metalinguistic negation of a previous statement, they are illformed; further, the example (32c) can only have the interpretation in which some has scope over negation.
(32) a. * Jane isn't coming too. It turns out that neg-preposing with n't is a late development in the history of English. In Elleg°ard's (1953) corpus (which contains more than 10,000 tokens of negative declaratives, affirmat ve and negative questions, and negative imperatives collected from texts ranging from late Middle English to the 18th century), 9 neg-preposing with n't firs appears in late 17th century. Before the development of n't, neg-preposing occurred with not, as in Hath not a Jew eyes? in (35). 10 In present-day English, only n't can prepose, while not cannot. But the archaic usage of not seems to have survived, making available for modern non-preposed not the interpretation corresponding to archaic neg-preposing of not.
The crucial point is that the Ô/ Ô ambiguity arises only if the epistemic implicature is present. That is, the existence of the epistemic implicature carried by preposed negation (or by an archaic version of preposed negation)
is a necessary condition for the Ô/ Ô ambiguity to arise. This means that the property of preposed negation that gives us the implicature should be somehow involved in the mechanics of the ambiguity.
SUMMARY OF THE DATA
The data presented in the section have shown the following. Yn-questions with preposed negation (or with its archaic lower version) carry the positive epistemic implicature that the speaker believes Ô, whereas yn-questions with non-preposed negation do not necessarily carry this implicature (Generalization 1). Furthermore, preposed negation yn-questions -more generally, negative yn-questions with the epistemic implicature Ô-are ambiguous between a reading double-checking Ô (PI-questions) and a reading double-checking Ô (NI-questions). PI-questions may be used in contradiction contexts and simply as suggestions about who Ô holds for. NI-questions may be used in contradiction contexts but they cannot be used as suggestions about who Ô holds for. These conclusions, and the evidence for them, are summarized in Table 1 .
These facts give rise to the three questions that we posed above in section 1, as well as to the additional question in (ii-bis) below, which follows up on (ii). These questions will be addressed in turn. 
i. Why does preposed negation force the existence of an epistemic implicature, whereas non-preposed negation does not?
ii. Why are preposed negation questions -more generally, negative yn-questions with an epistemic implicature-ambiguous? In other words, what property of negation is it that, besides triggering an epistemic implicature, produces Ladd's Ô-question / Ô-question ambiguity and its correlation with PIs vs. NIs?
ii-bis. Why are PI-questions suitable in suggestion contexts for Ô whereas NIquestions cannot be used in suggestion contexts for Ô?
iii. Why is the implicature raised by preposed negation a positive implicature, both in PI-questions and in NI-questions? That is, why is the polarity in the question as a whole opposite from that in the implicature?
VERUM and the existence of an epistemic implicature
This section shows how the presence of an epistemic VERUM operator in ynquestions triggers the existence of an epistemic implicature. First, in positive yn-questions, we will see that VERUM can be overtly spelled out with the English epistemic adverb really and we will show how it triggers the existence of an epistemic implicature. Second, the analysis will be extended to ynquestions where the presence of VERUM is signaled by phonological stress on a polarity element (Verum Focus in Höhle (1992) ). Finally, we will turn to yn-questions with preposed negation.
VERUM ARISING FROM really
Positive yn-questions (with neutral intonation) like (36) are epistemically unbiased. If one wants to ask the corresponding positive question but with an epistemic bias, a commonly used strategy is to add the epistemic adverb really (inherently focused), as in (37). As happens with negation preposing, the addition of really in the positive yn-question (37) triggers an epistemic bias of the opposite polarity: it adds the negative epistemic implicature that the speaker believed or expected that the negative answer is true. 11
(36) Does John drink? No epistemic implicature necessary.
(37) Does John really drink? Negative epistemic implicature: The speaker believed or at least expected that John does not drink.
This interpretive difference can be witnessed when we insert the two types of sentences in an epistemically unbiased context, as in (38). Whereas a 11 Epistemic really in (ib) needs to be distinguished from the intensifie adverb really in (ia). Also, Anthony Kroch (p.c.) pointed out to us that there is also a non-intensifie , non-epistemic use of really that roughly means "in the actual world rather than in some other relevant world". This use is illustrated in (ii). The difference between 'in-actuality' and VERUM really's can be seen in (iii). When we have the auxiliary did -emphasizing, like VERUM, that the speaker is certain about the truth of the proposition-the VERUM-really precedes did or follows it as a parenthetical (as in (iiia-b)), whereas the 'in-actuality'-really follows did as a non-parenthetical (as in (iiic)). Also, languages like Spanish distinguish these two really's lexically, as shown in (iv). All the examples of really in the text are intended as VERUM.
(i) a. Sandra is really clever.
b. Sandra really is clever.
(ii) Gore really won the election though Bush is president. Let us take a closer look at the epistemic operator really or VERUM. As a firs approximation, consider the run-of-the-mill epistemic operator denotation in (40), where Ü is a free variable whose value is contextually identifie with the addressee (or with the individual sum of the addressee and the speaker) in our examples:
The function define in (40) is the correct denotation for straightforward epistemic expressions like be sure, be certain or epistemic must. But note that, though really or VERUM is often epistemically fl vored, it is not interchangeable with pure epistemic expressions like be sure. For example, be sure in (41a) asserts certainty about the speaker's own inner sensations, which is a bit odd (as if the speaker could be confused about that); (41b), instead, is perfectly fine and the presence of really simply emphasizes or insists that the addressee should take the proposition as true: (41) The difference between a purely epistemic operator and really or VERUM also surfaces in law court scenarios. After a witness' assertion, it is often relevant to check the degree of certainty of that witness' assertion without conveying any disbelief. This can be achieved by using the pure epistemic expression be sure, as in (42S), but not by using really, as in (42S'). (42) Ground or set of propositions that the speakers assume in Û ¼¼ to be true (Stalnaker, 1978 , Roberts, 1996 .
VERUM, UNBALANCED PARTITIONS AND THE EXISTENCE OF AN EPISTEMIC IMPLICATURE
To derive the interpretive difference between a positive yn-question with VERUM and one without it, let us look at the corresponding denotations. In a regular yn-question like (45), the only operator is the É-morpheme, repeated 12 Preposed negation yn-questions pattern like really in law court scenarios:
The butler wasn't in the dining room when the crime happened. Is there some guest, Mr. Beans, that also wasn't in the room at the time of the crime?
A: Yes. Mrs. Rumpel wasn't in the room.
S: This is important, Mr. Beans. Are you sure Mrs. Rumpel wasn't in the room at the time of the crime?
S': # This is important, Mr. Beans. Wasn't Mrs. Rumpel in the room at the time of the crime?
in (44). The semantic computation yields the denotation in (45d). Following Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) , question denotations can be viewed as inducing a partition on the set resulting from intersecting the propositions in the Common Ground. The partition corresponding to (45d) is sketched in (46):
Ô Ô Now, let us add the contribution of really or VERUM to obtain the corresponding really-question. The resulting semantic computation and partition are as follows:
(47) a. Does John really drink?
it is for sure that we should add to CG that John drinks", "it is not for sure that we should add to CG that John drinks"
Let us compare the two resulting partitions. 13 The regular yn-question yields a balanced partition between Ô and Ô, whereas the really-question 13 If we use the lexical entry for the É-morpheme in footnote 5, take Heim's (1994) meaning for know in (i) and assume that the speech act of asking a question R is roughly equivalent to an imperative speech act of the shape CAUSE-that-I-know-R, we obtain the same partitions as in the text.
results in an unbalanced partition where the choice is between absolute certainty about adding Ô to CG (the FOR-SURE-CG Ô cell) and any other degree of certainty (the FOR-SURE-CG Ô cell). The questions then are: Why is the balanced partition adequate in the unbiased context (38)? And why is the unbalanced partition inappropriate in this unbiased context and acceptable in the biased context (39)? These questions are easily answered once we accept some commonly assumed principles about the dynamics of conversation and the epistemic states of the speakers. First, a speaker's epistemic state consists of propositions with different degrees of certainty (cf. probabilistic epistemic models in Gärdenfors (1988) ). For example, an epistemic state may include propositions like "for a fact, Ô" (when the speaker has direct evidence for Ô), "must Ô" (when the speaker has indirect evidence for Ô), "probably Ô", "possibly Ô",
Second, Grice's (1975) Maxim of Quality does not require direct evidence for Ô, but (at least) indirect evidence for Ô, as stated in (49) (Landman (1986) :60). In other words, speakers often assert propositions that they assume true in the view of indirect evidence, e.g., because they heard it from some trustworthy speaker or they read it in a science book. The requirement to assert only propositions that one has direct evidence for would simply be too strong.
(49) Maxim of Quality: Say Ô only if you have at least indirect evidence that Ô is true.
Third and finall , we assume the following two conversational "moves."
The firs move is assertion. Assertion of Ô is the instruction to add Ô to the Common Ground (e.g. as in Roberts (1996) ) and it is governed by the Maxim of Quality. The second move is to question a move. For example, one of the speakers can question the instruction to add Ô to the Common Ground. We propose that this second, meta-conversational move is subject to an economy constraint:
(50) Principle of Economy: Do not use a meta-conversational move unless necessary (to resolve epistemic conflic or to ensure Quality).
Now we can return to our questions.
Why is the balanced partition with the cells Ô and Ô suitable in a context where the speaker has no previous epistemic bias about Ô? The balanced partition is a plan to add Ô to the CG if the addressee asserts Ô and to add Ô to CG if the addressee chooses to assert Ô. Similarly, in suggestion contexts, if Ô was relevant to the conversation but the speaker was completely unbiased between Ô and Ô, the balanced partition would be more economical and the unbalanced partition unmotivated.
Why is the unbalanced partition with the cells FOR-SURE-CG Ü Ô and FOR-SURE-CG Ü Ô appropriate in epistemically biased contexts? This partition asks whether the addressee is sure that Ô should be added to the CG or not. This question is relevant in a contradiction scenario: if the speaker had a previous belief concerning the truth or falsity of Ô and the addressee's utterance contradicted it, it is justifie to question the appropriateness of adding Ô to the CG. The meta-conversational question is also motivated in a suggestion scenario: if the speaker believes in the truth or falsity of Ô, but she does not have enough (direct or indirect) evidence to assert it, she can raise the question of whether the interlocutors should make this addition or not.
VERUM ARISING FROM POLARITY FOCUS
A similar VERUM operator has been claimed to arise in declaratives in certain cases of focal stress on polarity elements (see Höhle (1992) , though he leaves VERUM undefined) Focus stress on the auxiliary (or main verb) or on negation sometimes has a contrastive use. For example, NOT in (51) simply contrasts with the positive polarity of the previous clause. But, some other times, polarity focus in declaratives is interpreted as Verum Focus (Höhle, 1992) , where the function of the phonological stress is to emphasize or insist on the truth or falsity of the proposition, as in (52)- (53) (53) a. A: Joe believes / doesn't believe the kids will finis on time.
b. S: They will NOT finis on time.
If we apply our denotation of VERUM in (43) to (52), we obtain the denotation in (55), which seems adequate. Similarly, we defin in (54) a negative version of VERUM as the contribution of Verum Focus on NOT and we obtain the truth conditions in (56) for (53). c.
it is for sure that we should add to CG that Kimiko went to the Himalayas" (56) a. They will NOT finis on time. 
it is for sure that we should add to CG that it is not the case that they will finis on time"
Hence, it seems plausible to assume that Verum Focus -i.e., polarity focus whose intuitive effect is to insist on the truth of the proposition-in declaratives stands for the same operator VERUM that we define in the previous subsection. If polarity stress can signal the presence of VERUM in declaratives, then polarity stress in yn-questions is predicted to be able to trigger the existence of an epistemic implicature as well. 14 This prediction is borne out, witness (57)-(59). Example (57) gives us a context that is potentially epistemically unbiased. The speaker can be unbiased if no polarity stress is placed on the verb study (or if study simply contrasts with cheat), as in (57S). But, if we add a heavy stress on STUDY, as in (57S'), or on the auxiliary, as 14 The prediction is that yn-questions with polarity stress can but needn't trigger an implicature. In contrast contexts like (i), no epistemic bias is forced. No implicature obtains with dictum Focus either, where focal stress simply marks that the question is being re-asked (Creswell, 2000) , as in (ii). The prediction is that there will be contexts where polarity focal stress cannot be licensed as anything other than VERUM and that then the epistemic implicature will necessarily arise. (ii) I was wondering whether Sue visited you last week. So, DID she visit you last week? in (58), the implicature arises that the speaker believed or expected that Tom did not study for the class. S': DID he study for that class?
The same contrast obtains between the unstressed (59S) -no implicature-and the polarity stressed (59S') -with implicature:
(59) A: Buy some more non-alcoholic beverages for the grilling. Hubert is coming.
S: Does he not drink beer? 'Cause I also have some beer.
S': Does he NOT drink beer?
We compute the denotation and partition for Did he STUDY for that class? in (60) 
it is for sure that we should add to CG that Tom studied for that class", "it is not for sure that we should add to CG that Tom studied for that class"
In Does he NOT drink beer? in (59), focus on NOT signals the presence of the operator "FOR-SURE-CG-NOT Ü " define in (54). This gives the denotation and unbalanced partition in (62)-(63). The same partition and epistemic bias obtain if VERUM is spelled with really rather than just phonologically, as in Does he really not drink beer?. 
= "it is for sure that we should add to the CG that it is not the case that Hubert drinks beer", "it is not for sure that we should add to the CG that it is not the case that Hubert drinks beer"
FOR-SURE-CG-NOT Ü Ô FOR-SURE-CG-NOT Ü Ô Note, as an important aside, that the discussion in this subsection allows us now to make sharper our original claim about non-preposed negation ynquestions in Generalization 1. We saw that yn-questions with non-preposed negation can be epistemically unbiased, but we did not exclude the possibility that, given some special circumstances, they may give rise to an epistemic implicature as well. In this subsection, we have seen two such circumstances: Verum Focus and the addition of really necessarily trigger an epistemic bias in non-preposed negation yn-questions. There may be other means -possibly unrelated to VERUM-to convey an epistemic implicature as well (e.g., a particular sequence of pitch accents (see Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg (1990) ), or the fina intonational curve conveying some attitude of the speaker (see Bartels (1999) and Gunlogson (2001) ), to name two possibilities). But it seems correct to assume that, in non-preposed yn-questions with neutral intonation and without an element signaling VERUM, no implicature arises.
VERUM ARISING FROM NEGATION PREPOSING IN yn-QUESTIONS
We have shown how VERUM arising from the lexical item really and VERUM arising from polarity focus trigger the existence of an epistemic implicature. If we now assume that VERUM arises from the preposing of negation in ynquestions too, we can derive the existence of an epistemic implicature in preposed negation yn-questions in exactly the same way. Hence, we propose to assume (64) as our working hypothesis. With this assumption, question (i) receives the answer (i') below:
Negation preposing in yn-questions necessarily contributes an epistemic operator VERUM.
i'. Yn-questions with preposed negation necessarily have VERUM, whereas yn-questions with non-preposed negation may or may not have VERUM (depending on polarity focus stress and presence/absence of really). An unbalanced partition arising from a yn-question with VERUM is a metaconversational move asking for a fin degree of certainty and is, by the Principle of Economy, felicitous only if a previous epistemic bias exists. Yn-questions with normal intonation without VERUM result in simple, economical balanced partitions and are elicited when the speaker has no previous significan belief about Ô or Ô.
In the next section, we will show how the assumption (64) also helps us explain Ladd's intuitive ambiguity between Ô-and Ô-readings in preposed negation yn-questions (question (ii)). The semantic computation and partition for preposed negation questions will be also spelled out there. But, before we turn to Ladd's ambiguity, let us remind the reader that, so far, we have only derived the existence of an epistemic implicature but not the content or polarity of this implicature (question iii). We will return to this in section 5.
Ladd's ambiguity in yn-questions with Preposed Negation
The examples (6) and (7) = "that Jane is not coming", "that Jane is coming"
Ô Ô
Yn-questions with preposed negation have É, negation and, by hypothesis, VERUM. Given these three operators, we propose to explain Ladd's ambiguity as a scopal ambiguity between negation and the VERUM operator: negation scopes over VERUM in PI-questions, whereas VERUM scopes over negation in NI-questions. Note that the É operator will not contribute to any scopal ambiguity because it is the outermost operator in questions. Let us firs look at NI-questions. Here, VERUM scopes over negation. The LF and the denotation for the NI-question in (67) are given in (68) (ignoring the presupposition contributed by either). The question denotation induces the partition in (69), taking Ô to be "Jane is not coming".
(67) Scenario: Pat and Jane are two phonologists who are supposed to be speaking in our workshop on optimality and acquisition.
(68) a. Isn't Jane coming either?
c.
= "it is for sure that we should add to CG that Jane is not coming", "it is not for sure that we should add to CG that Jane is not coming"
(69) NI-question partition:
The resulting denotation and partition allow us to characterize formally the intuitions about the NI-question presented in the introduction and in section 2.2. First, the NI-question is a biased question with an epistemic implicature. This is reflecte in the shape of the partition: we obtain an unbalanced partition, with the FOR-SURE-CG option in one cell and all the other degrees of certainty about the move in the other cell. The second intuition is that the NI-question is a double-checking question about Ô, that is, that it has the Ô-question reading. This is clearly captured in the partition, where Ô is the argument of the epistemic operator in both cells. Finally, since the double-checked proposition is a negative proposition, NIs are acceptable, and PIs (under the immediate scope of negation for PPIs) are not acceptable (Ladusaw, 1980 , Progovac, 1994 , Rooth, 1992 
= "it is not for sure that we should add to CG that Jane is coming", "it is for sure that we should add to CG that Jane is coming"
(74) PI-question partition:
As before, this is not a balanced partition for an unbiased question, but an unbalanced partition for a biased question with an epistemic implicature: the FOR-SURE-CG option is in one cell, and all the other epistemic degrees are in the other cell. In contrast to the NI-partition, though, the PI-partition has Ô as the argument of the epistemic operators in both cells (Ô-question reading) , showing that the two interrogatives (68a) and (73a) (Ladusaw, 1980 , Progovac, 1994 , and the PI too requires adjunction to a positive IP. As for NIs, they are ruled out because no operator should intervene at LF between an NPI and its licensing negation (Linebarger, 1980 , Linebarger, 1987 , and because either must attach to a negative IP. This behavior is illustrated for PPI/NPIs in declaratives in (75). The PPI would rather in (75a) is licensed if negation scopes over the CAUSE operator at LF and not immediately over the PPI (and it is illicit otherwise). In contrast, the NPI budge an inch (75b) is only licensed when negation scopes immediately over the NPI.
(75) a. George wouldn't rather go because you are there.
* Õ CAUSES Ô: "George wouldn't rather go, and that is be- Before concluding this section, note that other types of yn-questions that we saw contain VERUM -yn-questions with really, with Verum focused auxiliaries and with non-preposed focused NOT-do not display the Ô/ Ô ambiguity, as the examples (77)- (80) demonstrate. This is expected under our account. If the reader has the patience to go back to their LFs and semantic denotations in section 3, he will notice that, besides VERUM for positive questions and negative VERUM for questions with NOT, there is no negation that VERUM can interact with. Hence, the Ô/ Ô ambiguity does not obtain. 17 16 The scope relations between VERUM and negation that we have proposed here are independent of the É operator, and hence one would expect for them to surface in constructions other than questions. In fact, Höhle (1992:124-6) proposes the same scopal ambiguity for German declaratives with Verum Focus: VERUM scopes over negation in (i), and negation scopes over VERUM in (ii). 
The Polarity of the Epistemic Implicature
In all the cases examined in this paper, the polarity of the question and the polarity of the epistemic implicature are opposite. Preposed negation ynquestions -no matter whether they are PI-questions with the Ô-reading or NI-questions with the Ô-reading-have a positive epistemic implicature. ambiguity? The answer is 'no'. As (i)-(ii) show, the only reading available is the Ô-reading, that is, the only possible scope is the surface scope: VERUM over negation.
(i) A: Ok, now that Stephan has come, we're all here. Let's go! S: * Is Jane really not coming too?
(ii) A: Pat is not coming. And we don't need to wait for Jane either...
S: Is Jane really not coming either?
We do not know why scope is rigid when VERUM and negation are spelled out as different words in English. But note that a comparable scope freezing effect also arises in German declaratives when Verum Focus is spelled out more distant from negation, in C ¼ rather than in V ¼ . Höhle (1992) Positive yn-questions with really or Verum Focus give rise to a negative implicature. And negative yn-questions with non-preposed (Verum-)focused NOT trigger a positive implicature. This raises our question (iii): Why is the implicature raised by preposed negation -both in PI-questions and in NIquestions-a positive implicature? More generally, why is the polarity in the question opposite from that in the implicature?
Furthermore, there is a difference between PI-questions and NI-questions that has not yet received an explanation: PI-questions can be used in noncontradiction scenarios to suggest Ô, but NI-questions cannot be used in a similar way to suggest Ô. This gives rise to our fina question (ii-bis): Why are PI-questions but not NI-questions suitable in suggestion contexts?
These two questions are addressed in the present section at the same time. First, beyond the standard denotations for yn-questions, the "intent" of a question will be shown to be a necessary factor to determine the overall meaning (truth-conditions and felicity) of yn-questions in general. Second, a few general assumptions about epistemic states and Gricean principles will be made explicit. Third, the notion of "intent", combined with these general epistemic and conversational assumptions, will be applied to preposed negation yn-questions, to positive yn-questions with really and Verum Focus, and finall to negative yn-questions with NOT.
THE "INTENT" OF A yn-QUESTION
Let us consider preposed negation yn-questions. In this case, our question (iii) can be re-formulated in the following way. Both PI-questions and NIquestions carry the positive epistemic implicature Ô, as repeated in (81)-(82). Given this, the choice of double-checking Ô or double-checking Ô correlates with whose proposition (i.e., speaker's or addressee's) is being double-checked. When the speaker asks the PI-question about Ô in (81), she is double-checking her original belief. When the speaker asks the NI-question about Ô in (82), she is double-checking the addressee's implied proposition.
The question then is: is there anything in the syntax/semantics/pragmatics of a PI-question that forces its content Ô to be the speaker's belief, and is there anything in the syntax/semantics/pragmatics of an NI-question that forces its content Ô to be the addressee's proposition? (81) A: Ok, now that Stephan has come, we are all here. Let's go! S: Isn't Jane coming too?
Positive epistemic implicature: The speaker believed or expected that Jane is coming.
(82) Scenario: Pat and Jane are two phonologists who are supposed to be speaking in our workshop on optimality and acquisition.
A: Pat is not coming. So we don't have any phonologist in the program. S: Isn't Jane coming either?
If we assume the semantics and partitions in the last sections, there is nothing in the semantics of PI/NI-questions per se that can help us derive this result. For compare the two partitions in (83) and (84). If we forge an account to derive the speaker's epistemic implicature Ô from the mathematical object that constitutes the PI partition (84), wouldn't that account wrongly derive the epistemic implicature Ô for the parallel NI partition in (83)? Even more dramatically, take the positive yn-question Is Jane really coming?, with VERUM coming from the lexical item really. Its partition, repeated under (85), is exactly the same mathematical object that we have for the PI-question in (84). But, contrary to the PI-question, the positive question Is Jane really coming? has the negative epistemic implicature Ô and not the positive epistemic implicature Ô. 
The problem here is that the question denotations and partitions that we have compositionally derived are not enough to characterize the complete meaning of these questions. In fact, this problem does not concern questions with an epistemic implicature only, but yn-questions in general. Bolinger (1978) noted that yn-questions are not the same as alternative questions with or not; that is, he noted that the complete meaning (truth conditions and felicity) of a yn-question cannot be characterized by the same dual partition generated by an alternative question with or not. As Bolinger's examples (86)- (87) show, yn-questions and alternative questions are not interchangeable. In (86), a request can be formulated with a yn-question but not with an alternative question. In (87), to suggest a possible answer for a wh-question, the speaker can use a yn-question but not an alternative question: Bolinger's (1978) point can be extended to a related contrast: a yn-question "pronouncing" one cell of the partition is not equivalent to a yn-question "pronouncing" the other cell of the same partition. For example, if the speaker wants to make a request for help, she will use the positive (88a) but not the negative (88b). If she wants to suggest as a possible explanation that you are tired, she will use (89a) but not (89b) Another context where the pronunciation choice matters is when it is made explicit which of the two cells the speaker is interested in pursuing a conversation about, with possible follow-up questions:
(90) Scenario: S and A know that, every morning, Carlos drinks either coffee or tea. S has no previous bias about which Carlos drank this morning. S is interested in studying coffee consumption and its effects on people and does not care about tea. It is beyond the aim of this paper to give a formal account of Bolinger's observation and of the pronunciation choice in yn-questions in general. The difference between asking Ö?, asking not Ö? and asking Ö or not? may be strictly semantic or may be pragmatic in nature. We will remain agnostic about this issue. What is important for the purposes of this paper is that the pronunciation choice is a crucial ingredient of the overall meaning of a yn-question. We will talk about the "intent" of a question to refer to the combination of its semantic denotation and whatever the pronunciation choice adds to it. 18
EPISTEMIC STATES AND CONVERSATIONAL PRINCIPLES
Before we go back to our epistemically biased questions, let us briefl summarize the principles governing epistemic states and conversation exchange that we will use in interaction with the "intent" of yn-questions.
As indicated in subsection 3.2, we assume that a conversationalist's epistemic state consists of a set of propositions with different degrees of certainty. The degree of certainty of each proposition is not gratuitous, but motivated by the amount of evidence accumulated within the epistemic state in support of that proposition, as roughly indicated in (91). We also assume that epistemic states are consistent, that is, that they do not contain nor entail contradictory propositions and that (92) holds: (91) a. A conversationalist C believes For a fact Ô iff C has direct evidence for Ô. b. A conversationalist C believes Must Ô iff C has at least indirect evidence for Ô and no evidence against Ô. c. A conversationalist C believes Probably Ô iff C has much more evidence for Ô than against Ô.
18 Using Decision Theory, Nilsenova and van Rooy (2003) present a formal pragmatic characterization of the effect of the pronunciation choice that is compatible with our notion of "intent". (They assume the lexical entry for É in (19), but they point out that the definitio (i) in footnote 5 could be used too.) In a nutshell, the speaker pronounces the cell whose utility value is higher (both cells have equal utility values in Ö or not?). A proposition Ô has a high utility value if its addition to the speaker's epistemic state would trigger a wide revision of it (see also (Han, 1998) , (Romero and Han, 2001 )) or its becoming true brings the speaker closer to her goal. We thank a reviewer for pointing out the implementation of Nilsenova and van Rooy (2003) . Note, though, that the "intent" or utility value of a question cannot derive the facts in the present paper by itself. We need VERUM in order to: (a) distinguish between the mild (contextual evidence) bias arising for the pronunciation choice in a yn-question without VERUM and the strong epistemic implicature triggered by a question with VERUM, as in (i), (b) to account for the different polarity pattern between the question and the content of the bias (same polarity in (ia) and opposite polarity in (ib)), and (c) to derive the Ô/ Ô-readings and contextual uses (contradiction vs. suggestion) of PI-and NI-questions. (See also footnote 6.) (i) a. Is today the seventeenth? µ Mild bias towards Ô b. Isn't today the seventeenth? µ Epistemic implicature that Ô d. A conversationalist C believes Likely Ô iff C has more evidence for Ô than against Ô.
e. ...
(92) Ö is evidence for Ô iff Ö is evidence against Ô.
As for Gricean conversational principles, we will use the following:
(93) Maxim of Quality: Say Ô only if you have at least indirect evidence that Ô is true.
(94) Maxim of Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
THE POLARITY OF THE IMPLICATURE IN Yn-QUESTIONS WITH PREPOSED NEGATION
Let us now go back to yn-questions with preposed negation. We saw that the PI-and the NI-question differ on the proposition they are trying to doublecheck. But they also differ in the cell of the partition that is chosen to be pronounced, that is, they also differ in the "intent" of the question. Let us evaluate the two parameters (double-checked proposition and pronounced cell) for each type of question. We start with NI-questions. Why are NI-questions felicitous in a contradiction context where the speaker believes Ô, as in (82), and unacceptable in a contradiction context where the speaker believes Ô, as in (95)?
(95) Scenario: Pat and Jane are two phonologists who are supposed to be speaking in our workshop on optimality and acquisition. S originally believes that Jane is not coming.
A: Pat is not coming. But fortunately for the phonologists we still have Jane... S: #Isn't Jane coming either?
Take the NI-question Isn't Jane coming either?, with the LF in (96b) and the partition in (97), where the pronounced cell is highlighted by a double line.
(96) a. Isn't Jane coming either?
(97) NI-question partition and pronounced cell:
Given that the FOR-SURE-CG Ü Ô cell is the pronounced cell, the "intent" of the question is concerned with the proposition "that you are certain that we should add to CG that Jane is not coming". Commonly, the certainty about the appropriateness of adding a proposition to CG depends on the certainty or conclusive evidence that the speakers have for the proposition at issue. Hence, the "intent" of the question is concerned with the proposition "that you have complete evidence for Ô". Now, we can see how this intent meshes with contradiction scenarios, where the speaker had an original belief and the addressee's utterance contradicted her belief. We see in (99a) that the intent of this question is compatible with the speaker's belief Ô and with the addressee's proposition Ô, as in scenario (82). Furthermore, it is incompatible with the opposite state of affairs described in (99b), as in scenario (95) That is, if the intent of the question is to ask the addressee to provide conclusive evidence (if he has it) for Ô, Ô must be the addressee's implied proposition and Ô cannot be. Simply put, the addressee cannot possibly provide conclusive evidence for Ô if he uttered and thus believed Ô. 19 Hence, for the "intent" of the question to be felicitous, the addressee's proposition must be Ô and the speaker's original bias must be Ô. Therefore, the NI-question has the positive epistemic implicature that the speaker believed Ô.
Let us now turn to the PI-questions. Why are PI-questions are acceptable in contradictions contexts if the speaker assumes Ô, as in (81), but infelicitous if the speaker assumes Ô, as in (100): (100) Scenario: S originally believes that Jane is not coming.
A: Pat already came, but we still have to wait for Jane.
S: # Isn't Jane coming too?
Take Isn't Jane coming too?, with the LF in (101b) and partition in (102). This time, the pronounced cell is the opposite one: Since the intent of the question is to ask the addressee to provide reasons -if any-to doubt Ô, Ô must be the addressee's implied proposition and Ô must be the original belief of the speaker, and not vice-versa. If, contrary to fact, the speaker believed Ô to a high degree, the speaker would already have evidence to doubt Ô. The addressee could not possibly provide further or more convincing evidence for doubting Ô if he uttered and thus believed Ô. 20 Therefore, PI-questions have the positive epistemic implicature that the speaker believed Ô.
In sum, in contradiction scenarios, the speaker can ask the addressee to provide conclusive evidence for the addressee's proposition or to give reasons to doubt the speaker's proposition. But, assuming that the addressee has a coherent epistemic state along the guidelines in (91) and (92) and that he obeys the Maxim of Quality, the speaker cannot ask the addressee to provide conclusive evidence for the speaker's proposition or reasons to doubt the addressee's proposition. This derives the positive epistemic implicature Ô for both NI-and PI-questions.
Our account of the polarity of the epistemic implicature based on the intent of the question also explains why PI-questions are possible in suggestion contexts without contradiction while NI-questions are not, as we saw in (27) and (28) In these suggestion scenarios, the addressee posits (implicitly or explicitly) a wh-question R (e.g. "who has/hasn't reviewed for us?"). Since the addressee does not provide any partial answer to R himself, by the Maxim of Quantity, the speaker is entitled to infer that the addressee does not know any answer to R, i.e., that, for all possible answers Ô to R, the addressee's epistemic state does not entail Ô. 21 Once we combine this conversational inference with the intents of the PI-and NI-questions, we obtain the following pattern:
(107) Intent of PI-question and suggestion scenario:
Given that I assume Ô, that you do not know any answer to R and that Ô is a possible answer to R, can you provide information -and, if so, what information-that would make me doubt Ô and would prevent us from adding Ô to CG?
(108) Intent of NI-question and suggestion scenario: # Given that I assume Ô, that you do not know any answer to R and that Ô is a possible answer to R, can you provide information -and, if so, what information-that would make me conclude Ô?
The assumption that the addressee does not know any answer to R does not preclude that, for some possible answer Ô to R, the addressee's epistemic state entails the negation of Ô or at least contains reasons to doubt Ô. Thus, the PIquestion, whose intent is to ask for reasons to doubt Ô (if any), is compatible with the premises of the conversation. But the assumption that the addressee does not know any answer to R does preclude the possibility that, for some possible answer Ô to R, the addressee's epistemic state entails Ô. This gives us the desired result: PI-questions asking for doubts about a possible answer to R are appropriate in suggestion contexts, whereas NI-questions asking for conclusive evidence for a possible answer to R are inconsistent with the conversational assumptions. 22 Furthermore, the PI-question in a suggestion scenario is only compatible with the speaker's epistemic implicature Ô and not with the epistemic implicature Ô. The "intent" of the question is to suggest that Ô be added to the Common Ground unless the addressee has reasons to doubt Ô. This is a licit suggestion if the speaker endorses Ô, as in (107) and that Ô is a possible answer to R, can you provide informationand, if so, what information-that would make me doubt Ô and would prevent us from adding Ô to CG?
In sum, the "intent" of the PI-question and of the NI-question determines, together with general epistemic and conversational principles, the positive polarity of their implicatures and their (un)acceptability in suggestion contexts. 23 
THE POLARITY OF THE IMPLICATURE IN POSITIVE BIASED
Yn-QUESTIONS
Let us now derive the polarity of the epistemic implicature in positive biased questions. We will illustrate it for the really-question in (110): (110) A: Pat already came, but we still have to wait for Jane. S: Is Jane really coming? Negative epistemic implicature: S believes or expects that Jane is not coming.
Is Jane really coming? has the LF in (111) and the partition in (112). We noted that the PI-partition (102) and this partition are exactly the same math- 23 Our account based on the intent of the question can be used to explain another difference between PI-and NI-questions. In contradiction contexts, both PI-and NI-questions are acceptable. However, a subtle difference in the attitude of the speaker sometimes arises in relation to the on-going information exchange. Compare the two questions in (i). The PIquestion (ib) can convey several attitudes of the speaker, ranging from strong conviction about her original belief Ô to genuine puzzlement and indecision between her original belief Ô and the addressee's implied proposition Ô. The NI-question (ia) ranges from indecision between Ô and Ô to almost acceptance of the addressee's proposition Ô. That is, although the two questions overlap on the possible attitudes of the speaker, they are "tilted" towards opposite ends and can sometimes convey different attitudes. This potential difference in the speaker's attitude can be captured by our account based on the intent of the question. The NI-question in (ia), asking for conclusive evidence for the addressee' proposition Ô, may be used when the speaker is seriously considering switching to Ô. The PI-question (ib), asking for any doubt about her previous belief Ô, can convey that the speaker is still entertaining or pondering her original belief Ô. ematical object. Crucially, although the two partitions are the same, the pronounced cells are opposite. The PI-question pronounces the FOR-SURE-CG Ü Ô cell, whereas the really-question pronounces the FOR-SURE-CG Ü Ô cell. This choice makes the intent of the two questions completely different: the PI-question asks for reasons to doubt Ô, whereas the really-question asks for reasons to conclude that Ô, as specifie in (113). In fact, the "intent" of the really-question is parallel to that of the NI-question in (98) Our account predicts that positive biased yn-questions cannot be used felicitously in suggestion contexts. This is due to the same reasoning that precludes the suggestion use for NI-questions: the speaker cannot ask whether the addressee has conclusive evidence for Ô if Ô is a possible answer to question R and it is assumed that the addressee does not know any answer to R, as indicated in (115 
This partition and pronounced cell are exactly the same as for the NIquestion, as the reader can easily check comparing (97) and (119). Hence, by the same reasoning that we followed for the NI-question, the intent of Is Jane NOT coming? is compatible with the speaker's belief Ô and with the addressee's proposition Ô and not vice-versa (see (98) and (99)).
Further, our analysis predicts that non-preposed negation with Verum Focus on NOT cannot be used in a suggestion context, for the same reason that NI-questions cannot, as we saw in (108). Our prediction is borne out, as illustrated in (120). We have seen that the standard denotations and dual partitions for yn-questions are not sufficien to characterize completely the meaning and felicity conditions of yn-questions in general (Bolinger, 1978) . A necessary ingredient to their overall meaning is related to the pronunciation choice, that is, to which cell of the partition is pronounced in uttering the question. This ingredient gives us the "intent" of the question. We have proposed that the opposite polarity pattern between the implicature and the question is determined by the interplay between the "intent" of the question and general conversational principles. In a nutshell, our question (iii) from the introduction receives the answer below:
iii'. When the intent of a question is to ask the addressee for conclusive evidence for a proposition Ô, that proposition Ô is the addressee's implied proposition and the complement proposition Ô is the epistemic implicature of the speaker. When the intent of a question is to ask the addressee for any possible (weak or strong) doubts about a proposition Ô, Ô is the original belief of the speaker and its complement Ô is the addressee's proposition. This idea, combined with polarity of the "double-checked" proposition, yields the correct implicature pattern. PI-questions ask the addressee for any doubt about Ô, and, hence, Ô is the speaker's original belief.
NI-questions and NOT-questions ask the addressee for conclusive evidence for Ô; thus, the complement proposition Ô is the content of the speaker's epistemic implicature. Finally, really-questions and positive yn-questions with Verum Focus ask the addressee for conclusive evidence for Ô; in consequence, the complement proposition Ô is the original belief of the speaker. In sum, in all cases, the polarity in the question and the polarity in the implicature are opposite.
Furthermore, we have used the "intent" of the question to explain why PIquestions are suitable in suggestion contexts without contradiction whereas NI-questions are not. We have proposed the answer to question (ii-bis) stated below:
ii-bis'. If the addressee posits a question R in search of a suggestion, the speaker infers that the addressee does not know any answer to R. A PIquestion, whose intent is to ask the addressee for any doubt about the possible answer Ô, is compatible with this conversational assumption.
An NI-question, whose intent is to ask the addressee for complete evidence for the possible answer Ô, is inconsistent with this conversational assumption. More generally, yn-questions whose intent is to ask the addressee for complete evidence are not suitable in suggestion contexts without contradiction.
Concluding Remarks
We started the present paper by proposing to entertain the following assumption: that preposing of negation in yn-questions contributes a VERUM operator. With this assumption, we have shown that a wide range of otherwise puzzling facts follow concerning preposed negation yn-questions and other comparable questions. First, preposed negation yn-questions necessarily carry an epistemic implicature, whereas yn-questions with non-preposed negation do not. We showed that a yn-question with VERUM returns an unbalanced partition that questions the appropriateness of a given conversational move (e.g. adding Ô to CG).
This type of meta-conversational move is elicited only when necessary to resolve some epistemic conflic or to ensure Quality, e.g., when the speaker had a previous belief and the addressee contradicted her, or when the speaker had a previous belief but she was not sure enough to simply assert it. This derives the fact that yn-questions with VERUM imply the existence of an epistemic implicature on the speaker's side.
Second, Ladd (1981) Third, in all yn-questions with an epistemic implicature, the polarity of the implicature and the polarity of the question are opposite. Here, the "intent" or pronunciation choice of a question becomes central. Given a contradiction between speaker and addressee, the speaker can ask the addressee to provide conclusive evidence for Ô only if the addressee endorses Ô and the speaker believes Ô, and the speaker can ask the addressee for any possible doubts about Ô only if the addressee believes Ô and the speaker maintains Ô. This, combined with the polarity of the proposition under VERUM, gives us the correct polarity of the implicature for all the questions at issue.
Fourth and finall , a question whose intent is to ask A for possible doubts about Ô (if any) is acceptable as a suggestion that Ô may be an answer to A's background question, but a question whose intent is to ask A for complete evidence for Ô is infelicitous in these conditions. In sum, all these facts follow if we assume that preposed negation in ynquestions necessarily contributes the operator VERUM. It remains an open question why preposed negation should contribute VERUM while non-preposed negation does not (unless focused). Although we do not have a full answer to this question, we would like to point out that the peculiar property associated with preposed negation discussed in this paper is not restricted to yn-questions, but is also attested in declaratives with neg-inversion. Witness the pattern in (121) and (122) (121)- (122) do not carry VERUM and lack this conversational emphasis (unless never is focused), just as in non-preposed negative yn-questions.
We can relate the different behavior of preposed and non-preposed negative elements to the difference in discourse function between forms with canonical and non-canonical order, which is a pervasive phenomenon in language. That is, languages in general associate a fi ed discourse function with sentences with non-canonical order, such as scrambling in Korean and Japanese, left-dislocation, topicalization, VP fronting in English, and focus movement in Yiddish and Hungarian (Kiss, 1981 , Ward, 1988 , Prince, 1998 , Prince, 1999 , Choi, 1999 . On the other hand, discourse functions of sentences with canonical order are more fl xible, allowing for usage in a wider range of discourse contexts. We think that the different behavior of negative elements in preposed vs. canonical position is part of a much wider phenomenon having to do with how languages in general associate non-canonical syntactic forms with particular discourse functions. When a negative element is preposed, this noncanonical syntactic structure has the fi ed function of contributing VERUM. But, when it occupies its canonical position, it doesn't contribute VERUM, unless polarity focus is involved. Alternatively, given that non-canonical orders having to do with special discourse functions involve displacement to left-periphery in general, it could be that there is a functional projection for VERUM in the CP domain (in the spirit of (Rizzi, 1997) ) which triggers preposing of negation. In any case, this state of affairs in turn implies that, in the syntactic environments where the grammar does not allow for the noncanonical order, the canonical order should be ambiguous or, at least, vague. This is exactly what we fin in embedded negative yn-questions as in (123). The embedded question in (123) can be understood as reporting / pondering the unbiased question Is Jane not coming? or the biased question Isn't Jane coming?. 25 (123) Sue asked me / I wonder whether Jane isn't coming.
A fina point that we would like to mention is the relation between the questions studied in this paper and tag questions. The two constructions share some interesting similarities. First, we saw that, in questions with an epistemic implicature, the polarity of the question and the polarity of the implicature are opposite. This crossed pattern of polarities is the same as the distributional pattern of a type of tag questions which can be referred to as 'reversed polarity' tag questions (Sadock, 1971, Millar and Brown, 1979) , as illustrated in (124).
(124) a. John drinks, doesn't he? b. John doesn't drink, does he? Second, the sequence 'positive declarative + negative tag' basically makes the same contribution to the discourse as preposed negation questions of the Ô-question type: i.e., it conveys that the speaker has a belief Ô and that s/he wants to double-check Ô. And the sequence 'negative declarative + positive tag' makes a similar contribution to the discourse as positive questions with VERUM: i.e., it conveys that the speaker has a belief Ô and that s/he wants to confir this. This suggests that our analysis of biased yn-questions can be extended to reversed polarity tag questions. If we postulate a VERUM operator in tag questions (with an elliptical or pro-form VP), their polarity pattern and discourse effect will follow exactly in the same way as in our epistemic implicature questions. The only difference is that, in the tag sequence, the epistemic implicature is not implicit but overtly expressed by the preceding clause.
